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COMMENTS
CoRPORATIONs-RmHT OF CORPORATION TO PAY DIVIDENDS TO·
COMMON SHAREHOLDERS TO EQUALIZE PRIOR WRONGFUL PAYMENT.
TO PREFERRED SHAREHOLDERS-As a general propositjon, payment of
dividends may be made only out of surplus and not out of the capital
stock of a corporation.1 Though the cases evidence considerable confusion as to the meaning of "surplus" and "capital," it is clear that these
terms do not indicate a res. Rather, they are convenient designations
for legislatively prescribed limits as to when dividend payments are
proper.2 The capital stock rule; that the aggregate consideration received for no par stock plus the aggregate value of issued par stock may
not be tapped for shareholder distribution, is founded, loosely speaking,
on the notion that that amount should be "pledged" for the payment
of corporate debts, since creditors of a corporation may look only to corporate assets for payment. 3
If the directors of a corporation do pay dividends out of capital,
they are subject to common law and statutory redress for their action. 4
Usual remedies for wrongful dividend payment are of three varieties: 5
(1) injunction to restrain the illegal declaration of dividends,° (2)
damage suit against the directors for their breach of fiduciary obligations, 7 or (3) suit against the shareholders who have received payment
to compel them to return the dividends. The obligations and liabilities
of shareholders who have receiveq. wrongful dividend payments are the
primary concern of this comment.
118 C.J.S. § 460 (1939).
Ballantine ~nd Hills, "Corporate Capital and Restrictions upon Dividends under Modern Corporation Laws," 23 CALIF. L. REv. 229 at 233 (1935).
3 "The function of legal or stated capital is threefold: (1) the protection of creditors
against the shareholders; (2) the protection of senior shareholders against junior shareholders; and (3) the protection of all shareholders against mismanagement and the impairment
of their investment and its earning power." Id. at 233. 18 C.J.S. §460 (1939); cf. Salina
Mercantile Co. v. Stiefel, 82 Kan. 7, 107 P. 774 (1910).
4 12 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., §§5431-5442 (1932); 35 YALE L. J. 870
(1926).
0 See, generally, on wrongful payment of dividends and remedies therefor: 55 A.L.R. 8
(1928), supplemented in 76 A.L.R. 885 (1932) and 109 A.L.R. 1381 (1937); Fuld,
''Recovery of illegal and Partial Liquidating Dividends from Shareholders," 28 VA. L. REv.
50 (1941).
·
o Coquard v. The National Linseed Oil Co., 171 ill. 480, 49 N.E. 563 (1898) (dictum in suit brought by shareholders); Reid v. Eatonton Mfg. Co., 40 Ga. 98 (1869) (dictum that suit brought by creditors for injunction would be proper when the corporation is
insolvent).
• 7 At common law, directors wbo acted in good faith and without negligence were not
responsible for losses which resulted from their acts, although there was much confusion
2
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A. Agnew v. American Ice Co.8
Agnew v. American Ice Co. involved a corporation's adoption of
what is apparently a unique and previously untried remedy. The corporation concerned had a class shareholding structure of "cumulativenon-cumulative" (cumulative if earned) preferred stock, and common
stock. "The articles of incorporation provided for the payment 'out of
the surplus or net earnings of each fiscal year ... as and when declared
by the Board of Directors,' of a non-cumulative dividend upon the company's outstanding preferred stock 'at the rate of but never exceeding
six per cent, per annum, payable yearly, half-yearly or quarterly, before
any dividend shall be set apart or paid on the common stock for such
year,' and the distribution, in the discretion of the directorate, of 'the
remainder of the surplus or net earnings of each fiscal year ... as dividends among the holders of the common stock, as and when the
Board of Directors shall determine.'0 • • • Annual dividends at the established rate of $6 per share were paid on the preferred stock from the
year 1917, when the issue was authorized, to and including the year
1934.... At times, the annual earnings exceeded the dividends paid
on the preferred stock; and in other years, the- reverse was true. 10 In
1945, payment of the full dividend on the preferred stock was resumed;
and on September 24, 1946, a dividend of 50¢ on -each share of the
common stock was declared, payable 'out of the surplus or net earnings
of the Company.' It is this dividend that is under attack. The ... preferred shareholders [insist in suit to restrain the payment on the comover the degree of care required for immunity. 35 YALE L. J. 870 at 871 (1926). But
negligence might readily be found. See Fell v. Pitts, 263 Pa. 314, 106 A. 574 (1919).
Today, there are commonly statutes on directors' liability for improper payment of
dividends. Often, these statutes are ambiguous as to the degree of care required. 35 YALB
L. J. 870 at 870 (1926). Insolvency at the time of the dividend declaration may be a factor in fixing liability. 12 FLETCHER, Cvc. CoRP., perm. ed., §5432 (1932). But under
these statutes the cause of action belongs only to the statutory class designed to be protected. Fleisher v. West Jersey Securities Co., 84 N.J.Eq. 55, 92 A. 575 (1914). However,
if the corporation has the right and the directors refuse to sue, then shareholders may sue
in the right of the corporation. Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co., (C.C. D. N.J. 1905)
140 F. 117.

s (N.J. 1949) 66 A. (2d) 330.
o The type of preference expressed here bas been construed in a series cf New Jersey
cases, of which the leading case is Day v. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co.,
96 N.J.Eq. 736, 126 A. 302 (1924), to entitle the preferred to priority of payment over
common-if and when dividends are declared-of dividends at the stated rate for all years in
which a corporation has showed a profit, but only for those years. This provision is dis•
tinguished from that of the usual cumulative preferred grant of priority for all past years,
without regard to earnings in any year.
10 Emphasis added.
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mon] that dividends are not payable on the common stock until the
shortage in the preferred dividends for the years 1935 to 1944 [has]
been paid."11 Notwithstanding the charter provisions cited, the court
held that the prior payment to the common shar.eholders to equalize
prior wrongful payment to the preferred shareholders was justified. The
court reasoned that the statement of preferences in the articles· was but
a contractual grant of priority, not a guarantee of dividends. Being but
an "incident of ownership of the stock,"12 the preference could therefore be subjected to a "set-off" for overpayments, "for otherwise the one
class would benefit at the expense of [the funds available for dividends
on the common stock]."13 The court recognized that it was confronted
with a novel problem; in the light of past decisions on analogous matters, it is submitted that the decision is questionable.14

B. Recovery of Illegally-Paid Dividends
The recovery of illegally-paid dividends from shareholders is not
usually predicated on any theory that the shareholders have them•
selves committed a wrong, for the fundamental wrong in the picture
is deemed that of the directors:15 Yet when dividends are paid from
impaired capital at a time when the corporation is also insolvent, all
courts will allow recovery of the payments.16 Some courts sustain this
result on the "trust fund" theory17 that the assets of a corporation which
'is insolvent constitute a trust fund for creditors and, therefore, shareholders take the payment impressed with a trust in favor of these creditors. Other courts speak of a conveyance of assets in fraud of creditors,18 which assets may be recovered. Lack of notice of wrongful
payment is deemed immaterial when the corporation is insolvent, because, it is usually explained, the shareholder is a mere donee, who has
not given value.10 Some writers have vigorously questioned this last
proposition and prefer to sustain recovery in all fact situations when
11 Principal

case at 332-333.
at 334.
13 Id. at 333.
14 The conclusions of this comment are not based on facts or statutes peculiar ta the
principal case.
15 Wood v. National City Bank, (C.C.A. 2d, 1928) 24 F. (2d) 661.
10 Ibid.; Bartlett v. Smith, 162 Md. 478, 160 A. 440 (1932); Illness v. Dunnell, 61
N.D. 95, 237 N.W. 208 (1931).
17 Hayden v. Thompson, (C.C.A. 8th, 1895) 71 F,' 60.
18 Detroit Trust Co. v. Goodrich, 175 Mich. 168, 141 N.W. 882 (1913).
10 Bartlett v. Smith, 162 Md. 478, 160 A. 440 (1932); Mackall v. Pocock, 136 Minn.
8 at 13, 161 N.W. 228 (1917).
12 Id.
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payment was made during insolvency on the basis of statutory mandate. 20
There is considerable conflict in the cases as to right of recovery
from shareholders when the wrongful payment was made by a solvent
corporation. If the shareholder took with notice, recovery is always
allowed, for here, it is felt, the shareholder is an accomplice of the
directors in the commission of the wrong; nor can the shareholder offer
equities to overcome this complicity.21 But when the shareholder takes
without notice, the cases are in conflict. Many courts do allow recovery.
Some, again, justify this result on the trust fund analysis (an approach
inapplicable as to a going concem);22 some speak of fraudulent conveyance (though prior to insolvency, the creditor cannot question the
transaction). 23 The Minnesota court, pursuing a line of reasoning
it .had hitherto adopted in the "watered stock" cases, has rejected the
trust fund doctrine as to a going corporation, but has accepted the
equally doubtful ''holding-out" or "fraud" theory,24 as has the Michigan
court.25 A few courts have said that the wrong is solely, or in part, to
the corporation, thereby neatly dispelling the objection that a creditor
is not wronged by an improper dividend payment made by a corporation
20 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., §255 (1946); 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CoN•
VEYANCEs, rev. ed., §604 (1940). These writers argue that for this purpose the shareholder is a ''kind of creditor" who had earlier made a money investment. Cf. Fuld, "Recovery of illegal and Partial Liquidating Dividends from Shareholders," 28 VA. L. REv.
50 (1941).
21 Wood v. National City Bank, (C.C.A. 2d, 1928) 24 F. (2d) 661.
22 Williams v. Boice, 38 N.J.Eq. 364 (1884) (dictum, since the shareholders here
took with notice. It is not clear just what emphasis the court attaches to that fact).
23 Lexington Life, Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Page & Richardson, 17 B. Mon.
(56 Ky.) 412 (1856).
24 Mackall v. Pocock, 136 Minn. 8, 161 N.W. 228 (1917), relying on Hospes v.
Northwestern Manufacturing and Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. 1117 (1892), where
the court said that takers of "watered stock" should pay up to par in behalf of subsequent
creditors who "rely" in innocence on apparent capitalization. In the Mackall case the court
logically argued at p. 12: "ls there a sound distinction between a case where a corporation
disposes of its capital by issuing bonus stock, or stock but partly paid for, and one where it
disposes of its capital by paying dividends out of it? ••• [T]bey are all forms of ••• the same
thing •••, a disposition of corporation assets. • • • In each case the right of a creditor to
question the transaction depends wholly on whether he dealt with the corporation on the
faith that its capital was as represented."
Once conceding the "fraud" theory or any other rationale as a basis for compelling
shareholders to pay to par, one must accede to the court's view that there should be no distinction in the recovery-of-dividends action from that of action to compel payment of full
par value. The good faith of the shareholder is immaterial in both situations. "It is surely
no defense that the beneficiary of a voluntary conveyance which is fraudulent as to cred·
itors, is himself innocent of any wrong." Mackall v. Pocock, 136 Minn. 8 at 13, 161 N.W.
228 (1917).
211 American Steel and Wire Co. v. Eddy, 130 Mich. 266, 89 N.W. 952 (1902)
(dictum. The decision rests primarily on a statute).
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that continues solvent.20 There fs apparently no authority to sustain
the simple position that legislative mandate, implicit in the maintenance
· of capital requirement, holds foreign the notion of capital ·impairment
and demands that the shareholders pay upon insolvency. 27 There is
some legislation in the field to this effect, however, which legislation
apparently takes no account of good faith. 28
Many courts vehemently reje~t recovery as to payments taken in
good faith from a solvent firm. Most of these courts follow the leading
federal case of l\1cDonald v. Will·iams, 20 which rested chiefly on the
basis that there can be no trust fund as to the assets of a going corporation. The court argued that there is no res set aside as the subject
of a trust and pointed out that the going corporation has freedom in the
disposition of its assets, unbound by a "lien" of creditors.30 Implicit
in the opinion is rejection of a corporate cause of action. The Maryland court emphasized the practicality of modem business conditions,
finding it objectionable to require a shareholder who is one of a vast
number in a large enterprise to question the authority under which his
dividends have been declared or to give up those payments many years
later.81
C. Analysis of th~ "Set-off" Remedy
What does this authority suggest as to the conclusion of the Agnew
case? The court implicitly assumes that the wrong which has been done
is only to the common shareholder since the corporation was solvent
at the time of the first dividend declaration and still remains so. And
since that wrong is only to the junior shareholder, simple adjustment
will correct the wrong. Nor does the court make inquiry as to the
good faith of the preferred shareholders who received dividends, for the
20 Salina Mercantile Co. v. Stiefel, 82 Kan. 7 at 10, 107 P. 774 (1910); Detroit
Trust Co. v. Goodrich, 175 Mich. 168 at 173, 141 N.W. 882 (1913); Irving Trust Co. v.
Gunder, 234 App. Div. 252, 254 N.Y.S. 630 (1932).
27 However, the logic of the Minnesota court in drawing a parallel between liability
to pay full par value and the liability to repay dividends (see note 19, supra) would suggest that those courts which find the duty in the former situation on the basis of legislative
mandate inherent in the par value clause might properly find a duty in the second situation on a theory of legislative mandate inherent in the capital stock clause. See Ooregum
Gold Min..Co. of India v. Roper, [1892] A.C. 125, 66 L.T. 427.
2s 15 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §21.48.
20 174 U.S. 397, 19 S.Ct. 743 (1899).
80 But compare with other federal cases which do find a "trust fund" as to the assets
of a going corporation when the problem is as to liability to pay par value. Sawyer v. Hoak,
17 Wall (84 U.S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 731 (1873); Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143, 26 L. ed.
968 (1881). The views of these cases in the context of the Minnesota court's reasoning
(supra, note 19) would effect a different result in the McDonald case.
Bl Bartlett v. Smith, 162 Md. 478, 160 A. 440 (1932).
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court's remedy cannot adjust itself to that element; and as it cannot·
adjust itself to the presence or absence of good faith, so it cannot take
account of a far more basic fact: whether the preferred shareholders
who are now being penalized are the very same preferred shareholders
who once benefited by the wrongful payment. The latter severe shortcoming of the remedy here employed is recognized by the court, yet the
objection is dismissed lightly.32
Various possibilities suggest themselves to test the "set-off" or
"double-payment" r~medy in the light of precedent and logic. Assume
first that the second dividend payment is made at a time when the corporation is insolvent. It may readily be granted that no court would
sustain any adjustment of this sort on those facts, for a payment in those
circumstances would b.e the clearest case of a second wrong-added to
a first in the hope of making a right.. The remedy has meaning, then,
only when the common shareholder is paid at a time when the corporation still remains solvent; and •if that is so, it will likely follow
that the first payment was also made during solvency. Two questions
are raised: who is entitled to recovery and who should be compelled
to re-pay?

I. Who is entitled to recovery? Are creditors presently being hurt
by the later dividend declaration by a solvent corporation, or is it the
corporation, or the latter's common shareholders? In fact, though capital is impaired, the creditor is not endangered so long as the corporation remains solvent, or rather, so long as there is a reasonable relationship of security between the assets and liabilities ( current or permanent,
depending on this creditor) of the corporation. 33 Yet, it must be remembered that there is a legislative mandate, apart from practical business facts: the mandate requiring the maintenance of capital stock.
Those courts following the McDonald case34 would reject that contention, on these facts of a solvent concern, saying that as to creditors no
wrong was done by prior payment. And, a fortiori, there is even less
basis for objection by creditors on the facts of the principal case than
on those of the usual case involving an attempt to recover dividends
82 "No matter what the rule, individual shareholders will suffer some inequity; but it is
generally the preferable policy to sustain the equity of set-off for overpayments rather than
to deny it, for the transferee may by inquiry safeguard himself against the former, while
the latter course would unjustly enrich the preferred stockholders at the expense of the
holders of the common stock." Principal case at 335.
83 Ballantine and Hills, "Corporate Capital and Restrictions upon Dividends under
Modem Corporation Laws," 23 CALIF. L. R:Bv. 229 at 233 (1935); 2 GLENN, FRAUDULBNT
CoNVEYANCES, rev. ed., §604 (1940).
S4McDonald v. Williams, 174 U.S; 397, 19 S.Ct. 743 (1899).
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from shareholders, for here, not only was there solvency at the time
of the wrongful payment, but the corporation is still solvent. It is therefore unlikely that even those courts which on the usual facts of the
recovery-of-dividends action would allow recovery by creditors, though
payment was taken in good faith from a solvent firm, would on these
facts of present corporate solvency find any present right in the creditor
to complain.35
Any actionable wrong which exists, therefore, must be to the corporation or its shareholders. There is some authority for the former
proposition and at least" one well-reasoned case has gone so far as to say
that the corporation, though presently solvent, may yet recover dividends also paid out during solvency, despite the fact that there have
at no time been creditors in the picture.36 But the writer has found no
authority which would sustain the contention of a legal wrong to the
remaining shareholders. To recognize such a wrong is to disregard the
fact of corporate entity, for the corporation had owned the distributed
assets and it would logically seem that pursuit of those assets should
be the right of the owner.37 The court in the principal case thinks other35 However, it is interesting to speculate on what would happen should a corporation
on the facts of the principal case become insolvent at a later date. Would those courts
which allow recovery of dividends which were made by a solvent corporation to a bona fide
shareholder still allow recovery at that subsequent date if the second dividend transaction
has intervened? The answer logically would depend on whether the set-off was really
deemed a "recovery of dividends" by the corporation so that there was no longer a wrong
outstanding. The following argument might be made: declaration of dividends from surplus is discretionary with directors (subject to limitations on excess accumulation of surplus).
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). This is so even as to
cumulative preferred or "cumulative-non-cumulative" stock; there is no duty to pay dividends, the preference merely establishing priority if and when there should be a declaration.
But when the dividend is declared, a debt is established from the corporation to the shareholder. Staats v. Biograph Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1916) 236 F. 454. If, then, the corporation
declares a dividend out of surplus for the preferred (as in the principal case), it creates
a qebt for that amount. If the corporation then sets-off that debt (as in the principal case),
it has diminished its obligations by the amount of the set-off and has thus recovered the
prior wrongful payment. The reasoning, perhaps, is strained, but may offer a proper
analytical approacli for wiping out the wrong to the corporation: when a dividend is later
declared on behalf of the common, after the set-off transaction, the creditor has no remaining complaint, any dispute w:hich remains existing only between the various shareholder
classes.
The principal case, of course, does not accept this reasoning, saying that the set-off
which exists is only between classes of shareholders and not between the preferred and the
corporation.
86 Salina Mercantile Co. v. Stiefel, 82 Kan. 7, 107 P. 774 (1910). With skillful
reasoning the court rejects the defendants' contention, at p. 8 that the no-dividend-out-ofcapital rule is solely for the protection of creditors, and that, therefore, if a corporation
owes no debts, its directors may without doing a wrong divide any or all of its assets among
the stockholders, "since this would merely be restoring the property to its real owners."
87Gager v.·Paul, lll Wis. 638, 87 N.W. 875 (1901). And if the corporation refuses to sue, a shareholder may do so in its name, but, "when he does so, he merely enforces the right which the corporation has, and the relief granted must be measured by that
right." At p. 652.
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wise, for the theory of adjustment between classes that the court adopts
is predicated on the finding of an original wrong to the junior shareholders at the time of wrongful payment, which wrong is now held to
justify a second Houting of charter terms. Nor, unless the wrong is
solely to the junior shareholders, has any earlier harm to the corporation ever been cured. And, further, the court finds critical to its decission a discussion of whether the set-off violates the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act ban on secret liens in favor of a corporation;38 the court
concludes that it does not, not merely because this set-off is not a "lien,"
but, further, because the set-off is not in favor of the corporation.
If one does not accept the court's conclusion as to whose right was
invaded, as apparently no other court has, the payment to the common
ahead of the preferred shareholders seems merely a second wrong,
which not only does not "right" the previous wrong, but exists independently of it. An analytical rationalization might be offered for the
result; namely, that the corporation in the second dividend declaration
first declares a dividend for the preferred shareholders, creating a debt
as to the latter. It then diminishes that debt by a set-off measured by
the previous wrongful overpayment. Then, it may be argued, subsequent payment to the common shareholders is not in advance of payment to the preferred, but rather a later exercise of the director's discre-.
tion to declare dividends on the common.39 This, of course, is not the
approach of_ the New Jersey court.

2. From whom may recovery be made? There remains what is
probably the most serious objection to the remedy employed in the
Agnew case. That objection is that the corporation, in employing the
remedy, can take no account of the identity of those who did receive
prior wrongful payment and those who did not. Whereas in the usual
recovery-of-improper-dividends suit, apart from ilie theory on which it
is based, the corporation may pursue only those shareholders who did
actually receive the questioned payments, the remedy of set-off-in-favorof-common-shareholders cannot be adapted to a set-off penalty against
only those who in-fact had previously shared. Thus indiscriminately,
the blanket class penalty strikes all the class members. Those who received the prior wrongful payment and those who bought shares yesterday are equally punished. And, while totally innocent parties may
suffer, their predecessors in title go free, having pocketed and retained
the wrongful payments with impunity. Also, common shareholders
who became such subsequent to the wrongful payment now enjoy a
88 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §
89 See note 29, supra.
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windfall, since their advance payment violates their expressly conceded ·subordinate standing· in the receipt of dividends. \i\laiving all
other objections, one could find the New Jersey remedy sound only if
the persons who were shareholders at the time of the wrongful payment continued to be so. That situation will not probably exist, in
which event the dynamic existence which is characteristic of most
bodies of shareholders would militate against the remedy of the Agnew
case.40

D. Conclusion
It is difficult to ascertain the motivations prompting the unusual corporate conduct in the principal case. A closed corporation which has
experienced no intervening stock transfers between the time of a wrongful dividend declaration and the time of the subsequent "set-off" might
justifiably apply the remedy, assuming it would base such action on the
strength of the rationalization earlier suggested.
But in what is undoubtedly the setting of most corporations, the setoff approach appears neither analytically correct nor fundamentally ·
fair. The remedy faultily presupposes a group of shareholders which is
unchanging in membership; and since the supposition must generally
be incorrect, so, recent, innocent purchasers of the stock class which had
previously enjoyed the wrongful payment are subjected to penalties
in violation of their dividend ~ontract, while their predecessors who did
receive payment need not account for those payments. Further, what
must properly be viewed as a wrong to the corporation remains uncorrected-unless, of course, one denies the problem by denying the
premise, as did the court in the principal case.
These objections carry still further meaning since recovery of dividends would seem possible as an alternative remedy, at least in some
states.41

Theodore Sachs, S.Ed.
40 The court was aware of the difficulty, but did not think it damaging. See note 26,
supra. There is an additional problem, that of the mathematics involved. Do the common
shareholders now receive an aggregate payment equal to the wrongful overpayment, or a
per-share dividend equal to those formerly given, or wllat alternative measure is employed?
A final question which might be asked deals with the matter of directors' liability.
Would liability, if present, be extingui~hed by the imposition of a "set.:Off"? The answer
would logically be in the negative, unless the earlier-mentioned "rationalization" of the
corporation's conduct is employed.
41 Those finding a wrong as to the corporation. Salina Mercantile Co. v. Stiefel, 82
Kan. 7, 107 P. 774 (1910).

